The 29 June 2015 edition of Army Times contains an interesting piece on the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (BCT) at Fort Carson, CO. The BCT Commander there has implemented a policy prohibiting his Soldiers from wearing the combat patches, earned during previous combat deployments, during field training. He says that the purpose is to “promote a unified Army culture,” and his spokesman justified it on the grounds that the prohibition has allowed the Striker Brigade to train “more efficiently.” Personally, I find both of these statements preposterous, and I suspect that this little tidbit, from later in the article, reveals the real impetus behind the policy: “[the spokesman] said he and [the commander] had similar experiences previously, such as in the 75th Ranger Regiment…” In other words, the BCT commander is forcing this policy on the Soldiers of his brigade for no better reason than that it happens to be what he is accustomed to from a time when he was in a very different kind of unit, and which he prefers.
The BCT commander’s policy is probably galling to many of the seasoned veterans in his brigade. And while I wholeheartedly sympathize with their frustration and deplore the policy as misguided at best, in isolation it would be of little importance. Unfortunately, however, his attitude seems emblematic of a larger problem of the leadership culture of the Army today, a problem that I call the commoditization of Soldiers: which is to say, the tendency of the Army to view Soldiers (and prospective Soldiers) as nothing but interchangeable assets, any one of which that deviates too far from prescribed tolerances, can be consigned to the scrap heap.
While I certainly applaud the BCT’s aim of promoting “a unified Army culture,” I am incredulous that he believes that he has to suppress, even temporarily, the individual accomplishments of his Soldiers to do so. Does he really believe that the morale and cohesion of his BCT is so tenuous that it cannot coexist with one of the very few, very highly constrained and regulated expressions of individual pride that the Army allows a Soldier in uniform – the recognition of former combat experience? And if he does believe that, is he really so oblivious to the workings of the human heart as to be unaware of the resentment that his policy will foster in the minds of many? Or, as is more likely the case, is the brigade commander just so egocentric that he finds any expression of pride by one of his Soldiers in a previous unit irksome, and is happy to have an excuse to suppress it, if even temporarily and even at the cost of trampling on the feelings of his combat veterans? Perhaps I overstate the case, but I find 1st Stryker BCT’s combat patch policy to be an affront to the American spirit and antithetical to the American tradition of citizens taking up the arms of the Republic of their own accord while retaining their status as free and independent men and women.
Unfortunately, the commander of the 1st Stryker BCT is hardly the only officer to feel the impulse toward excessive uniformity and intolerance for any deviation from the norm. I am reminded of an exchange of e-mails between a very senior General Officer on the Army staff and the leadership of the Army National Guard a couple of years ago, on the topic of direct commissions. It happens that at the time of this exchange a program had existed for several years under which Soldiers of the USAR and ARNG meeting certain criteria could apply for direct appointment to 2nd Lieutenant, vice the usual route of going to Officer Candidate School (OCS). It seems that this senior GO had gotten the impression somehow that a huge percentage of ARNG lieutenants – something like 20% if memory serves – had been directly commissioned instead of going through ROTC or OCS. Appalled, he wrote an e-mail to the leadership of the ARNG objecting to such a large portion of new officers commissioning without any pre-commissioning training. It turned out, though, that the GO’s data was grossly incorrect, having been generated by members of the Army Staff using an exceedingly defective database query. But when notified of the error, and that the actual number of ARNG direct appointments was actually less than 2%, the GO doubled down, resending the exact same e-mail to the ARNG leadership, substituting the less than 2% figure for the previous 20-odd percent figure. Now, I hold no particular brief for the RC Direct Commission policy – it matters to me little one way or the other whether it stays or goes. But what I do find remarkable is that in the mind of one of the top GOs on the Army staff, 2% of ARNG officers directly commissioned was just as unacceptable as 20%. In other words, he found it intolerable that ANYONE be commissioned via any route other than the usual manner. While I can’t speak to the way the USAR implemented the program, I can attest that direct commissions were approved sparingly in the ARNG, generally only for seasoned NCOs with strong track records of leadership in key positions such as squad leader or platoon sergeant, multiple outstanding NCOERs in a variety duty positions, and – often –combat experience. But this General was not open to any of that; what mattered to him was that every officer undergoes the exact same pre-commissioning experience (or, rather, one of the three usual routes) irrespective of the individual qualifications of the Soldier. The exceptional candidate was apparently inconceivable to him.
The Army is increasingly less capable of evaluating individual people on their individual circumstances, and has become worryingly prone to slavish application of ruthless screening criteria, without ever really considering an individual’s circumstances. Anyone who doubts me need look no further than the Army’s applicant screening at MEPS. Any civil infraction, however minor, and any contact with mental health professionals whatsoever (save for grief counseling) is exceedingly likely to derail an aspiring Soldier’s career before it even begins. Likewise for a dizzying array of medical conditions and defects, many of which would not seem to any ordinary person as being particularly problematic for military service (one of my favorites being too many callouses on the feet of a farm girl, related to me by a former recruiter friend of mine). Another anecdote reveals just how driven the Army is to suppress any deviation from the established norm: On one occasion several years ago I was at lunch in the Pentagon, at the basement food court near the Metro entrance, with a senior officer in the ARNG G1 and a Colonel who was working on a panel looking to reduce the risk of suicide in the Army. He revealed to us that the panel had actually considered proposing a policy making a history of having been abused as a child a disqualification for entry into the Army on the ground that they purportedly have higher rates of certain problems than other people. I was aghast that any responsible officer in the Army would even consider victimizing a young person anew by denying them entry, for no other reason that the person had been victimized previously. Happily this proposal was discarded, not on the grounds of the self-evident injustice of it, but because it would have too many false negatives (that is, most kids who are abused don’t have problems when they grow up, even if they are more likely than others to have them). But the fact that such proposal could be seriously discussed by responsible people speaks volumes in itself about the state of the Army.
When I was a cadet at West Point and later a young officer, the Army looked very different to me. At that time I felt that the Army was an institution that invested in people, that protected people, that made them better. I believed that if I served the Army loyally, the Army would in turn do well by me. And it did do well by me. I have always been grateful for all the Army gave me, doubtful as it may be that I always deserved it. But I wonder whether the Army is the same today. I look at this great institution now and I see an organization that asks the young people of America to risk all for it, but that will risk nothing for them in return. And it is this risk-aversion that ultimately drives the Army’s remorseless insistence upon unhealthy forms of uniformity. The Army establishes standards of conduct, medical fitness, training and appearance for its own protection and then overcompensates in their application, ruthlessly screening out God knows how many perfectly suitable young men and women, lest in a lapse of lenity some hapless soul should get through and inflict embarrassment on the institution. A similar dynamic applies to those already in Service. Time was – or so it seemed to me – that growth and rehabilitation were possible in the Army. That one might have a lapse today, but if found to have potential for growth, one might be afforded the opportunity to live it down and continue to serve. Not so now; in today’s Army any lapse can be relied upon to result in career-destroying consequences, irrespective of the Soldier’s potential for rehabilitation. To a certain extent, loyalty has become a one-way street in the Army, and that one way is “up.” The Army expects loyal service from its Soldiers, and self-sacrifice, and the willingness to risk everything – but it will risk nothing for those Soldiers in return – not even a tiny bit of its precious reputation. Soldiers are expected, as individuals, to give their loyalty to the Army. Loyalty means nothing if not the commitment to accept risk on behalf of, to endure hardship for, and overlook the foibles of the beloved, even when our beloved might be a little embarrassing – and this Soldiers do for our great Army every day and, rightly so. But ask yourself, candidly: Does the Army do for individual Soldiers what it asks Soldiers do for it?
And loyalty isn’t the only value that flows in one direction in today’s Army. The other, I am sad to say, is tolerance. At this point (if not before) many of my readers (especially those of flag rank) will scarcely be able to contain their rage as they howl out their vehement objections (this once happened to me literally, and not just figuratively, with the very same GO referenced above, when I had the temerity to point out to him the plain and obvious fact that the Army was treating ARNG officers differently than others in certain aspects of the promotion system – but that’s a story for another day…). My detractors will point out the many efforts the Army has taken to take care of military families, to reduce suicide, to help Soldiers deal PTSD and other forms of stress, to promote racial, ethnic, and gender tolerance, and innumerable other beneficent efforts on behalf of Soldiers and their families. And so the Army has done all this, and quite rightly so. But in response, I offer the poetic language of our Lord: “these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone” – for as the insightful reader will already have discerned, each of the expressions of loyalty and toleration enumerated above are directed towards groups: “Families”, “Victims”, racial groups, religious groups, gender groups. Not one of them is directed toward toleration of the foibles of individual people, or loyalty on a personal basis. The Army makes much about toleration and respect for distinct demographic groups, and quite correctly asks Soldiers to do the same. But what does the Army do Soldiers individually? By way of answer, I offer an anecdote related by a retired NCO friend of mine, after visiting with some Active Duty Soldiers overseas. As my readers will well know, the Army has long engaged in a concerted effort to encourage Soldiers to seek mental health treatment if they need it, and has sought to foster a climate of toleration for those who feel they need such help. And this is all to the good. But my friend found a reality far different from the ideal when visiting these Soldiers. The verdict of these young men was simple: open your mouth about any emotional or mental problems stemming from your combat tours, and find yourself yanked out of your leadership position and relegated to perpetual CQ duty. Not what I call loyalty and tolerance.
It seems to me that the Army is of two minds in what it wants as Soldiers. I’m sure that subjectively the Army aspires to the kinds of loyalty and toleration that I hint at here; it respects the tradition of the citizen Soldier, and it’s leadership doctrine certainly values the idea of developing people and helping them overcome their shortcomings and growing into better Soldiers. The Army even conducted a study a number of years ago into how folks who entered the Service with various types of waivers performed – and found that these Soldiers outperformed others in some important respects. But subjective intent matters a lot less than objective action. Objectively, the Army’s behaviors indicate that the institution wants, not freeborn men and women raised in an imperfect world, with all the intendant flaws and blemishes that come with that. Rather, the Army, through its objective actions, shows that what it wants is something akin to Clone Troopers: Perfectly uniform, perfectly loyal, perfectly trained, and perfectly reliable automatons. It wants fantastical supermen with the discipline of the Roman Legions, the loyalty of huskies running the Iditarod, the ingenuity of Indiana Jones, and the rectitude of Mr. Spock. What the Army wants, in short, is troops with everything that makes the American Soldier great, without any of the faults that make him human. In other words, it wants the impossible.